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This study takes a repertoire-oriented approach to examining how social and traditional 
media usage affect political engagement in China. Building on previous studies and giving 
them a new direction, we examine how various social media platforms and traditional 
media outlets are combined in cross-media repertoires of young Chinese adults. We do 
this with the help of survey data collected in mainland China. Using the Step-3 approach 
of latent class analysis, we then consider how these repertoires can be explained by 
various individual and contextual factors and what impact the repertoires themselves 
have on various forms of political involvement. The study identifies 6 distinctive media 
repertoires: digitally focused, communication oriented, minimal users, moderate 
omnivores, voracious omnivores, and print interested. Repertoires are mainly correlated 
with age, education, and perceived media credibility. In China, young adults with the 
most omnivorous and print-oriented media repertoires display the highest levels of 
political trust, political interest, and online political engagement. The study also discusses 
the implications of these results. 
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The rise of the Internet and social media has spurred research into their “democratic potential”: 
the question of whether new media are able to increase political participation among citizens. More 
concretely, new media are hypothesized to give new impetus to political engagement by creating a platform 
for the common people, by intensifying social interaction, and by offering devices that appeal to youths 
(Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Skoric & Poor, 2013; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). There are indications showing 
that the use of social media is a positive and significant predictor of an individual’s political participatory 
behaviors, both online and off-line (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012), but overall the effect seems 
to be modest (see Boulianne, 2015; Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang, 2016). The promise of social change 
attached to social media acquired a new dimension during the Arab Spring, where social media were played 
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up as crucial resources for collective action in societies where traditional media are controlled by the state 
or subject to censorship (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). The current research focuses on China. Research on 
the relationship between media usage and political participation that addresses non-Western countries and 
other political regimes is still relatively scarce (Boulianne, 2015; Skoric, 2011; Skoric, Zhu, & Pang, 2016). 
Furthermore, students of political outcomes in Western countries have turned their attention to the impacts 
of media or news “repertoires” (e.g., Strömbäck, Falasca, & Kruikemeier, 2018), but this approach is still 
absent in works on China. We will argue here that the strong diversification of social media platforms in 
China during the past decade makes it imperative to move beyond analyzing social media as a single 
category of media usage. 
 
The present study has the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Which current media repertoires can be identified among young Chinese adults? 
 
RQ2: How can adherence of young Chinese adults to these repertoires be predicted by their social 
backgrounds? 
 
RQ3: How do these repertoires relate to the political involvement of young Chinese adults? 
 
As a research context, China is a country with a state-controlled media system in which a highly 
diversified ecology of social media platforms has emerged during the past decades (Gleiss, 2015; Li, 2019). 
We focus specifically on young adults because their media preferences are generally considered to be very 
different from those of older generations, as they grew up with Internet-based media (e.g., Edgerly, 2017; 
Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). We are working with a concept of “young adults” broadly defined as 
individuals between 18 and 40 years of age. 
 
This study extends previous research on media repertoires and their impacts in three ways. First, 
we pay more attention to the specific social media platforms and their functionalities in the Chinese media 
context than did previous studies. We look closely at eight widely used platforms and try to analyze how 
they are combined with more traditional media in the media repertoires of young adults. Second, we 
examine three different aspects of political involvement—political trust, online political engagement, and 
political interest—to get a better sense of how, in a diverse yet restrictive media context, media repertoires 
relate to this kind of involvement. Finally, using data from an original online survey in China, we use the 
relatively advanced technique of latent class analysis (LCA) to find repertoires inductively, and the analysis 
of distal outcomes (i.e., dependent variables) to relate repertoires to political variables (see Strömbäck et 
al., 2018; Vermunt, 2010). 
 
Social Media Usage and Political Involvement 
 
The rise of the Internet has often been equated with the opening of new communication 
opportunities, which were unavailable in the world of traditional forms of media, and which changed 
citizens’ political involvement. In particular, the fast diffusion of social media has prompted many studies 
into the possible effects of social media usage on citizen or civic engagement (Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang, 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Cross-Media Usage  3801 
2016; Skoric, Zhu, & Pang, 2016), political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012), and political trust 
(e.g., Ceron, 2015). These studies share the premise that for societies to function well, it is important that 
citizens express their political viewpoints, engage in political and social activities (e.g., participate in 
meetings where societal issues are discussed), and have a certain amount of trust that their political system 
functions adequately. Norris (2000, 2011) argues that civic engagement, political interest, and trust in 
government form a “virtuous circle” in which the separate elements reinforce one another. Nevertheless, 
there are also substantial differences between these concepts. 
 
Most studies of social media effects have focused on forms of “participation” or “engagement” 
(often operationalized through certain activities) because social media are agency enhancing: They have 
enabled citizens to voice their political views directly, either by publicizing them in written form or via 
interactions with others (Boulianne, 2015; Skoric, Zhu, Goh, & Pang, 2016). Empirical studies have 
provided evidence that social media usage is indeed generally associated with other forms of civic and 
political engagement (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Skoric, Zhu, 
Goh, & Pang, 2016; Xenos et al., 2014). Political interest is less often studied as an outcome variable; this 
is because in Western countries, this characteristic is considered to be rather conditional on taking action, 
and therefore is modeled as a control variable (Vissers & Stolle, 2014). But a study carried out in Sweden 
found similar positive effects of social media usage on both political interest and (off-line) political 
participation (Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013). 
 
Political trust concerns the way citizens view the operative political institutions, such as 
government and parliament, and its presence indicates that such institutions are doing their jobs in an 
honest, responsive, and accountable manner (Ceron, 2015). Higher levels of news media use are generally 
positively associated with political trust (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, & Shehata, 2016), but social media use 
has been found to have a negative impact (Ceron, 2015). 
 
In Western countries, many of these aspects of political involvement are connected to the functioning 
of democracy (Norris, 2000). Obviously, such aspects have no equivalent in nondemocratic countries such as 
China. Nevertheless, in the Chinese context, various studies show similar social media effects: usage of Sina 
Weibo was associated with increasing willingness to participate politically (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012), 
online forum usage was positively associated with online political discussion among Chinese college students 
(Mou, Atkin, Fu, Lin, & Lau, 2013), and usage of social networking sites for information exchange was 
positively related to certain forms of political participation that were not organized by party officials (Zhang 
& Lin, 2014). At the same time, studies also highlight the complexities of the political situation: expressing 
political opinions online is strongly related to nationalistic attitudes, which are influenced by party propaganda: 
swaying domestic and international opinion in favor of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policies (Anne-Marie 
& Wang, 2009; Hyun & Kim, 2015). Political trust, or system support, are mainly enhanced by using traditional 
media such as newspapers and television, but the effects of using Internet or social media are mixed. Whereas 
Shen and Guo (2013) find negative effects of Internet usage, Hyun and Kim (2015) state that “public use of 
the Internet for political expression contributes to sustaining the existing Chinese system rather than 
undermining it.” (p. 775). More recently, Chen and Sun (2019) reported that individuals who are influenced 
by social media such as WeChat and Sina Weibo tend to have lower trust in government. 
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Media Repertoires and Their Impacts 
 
Most of the work carried out so far on the relationship between social media usage and the various 
manifestations of political involvement collapsed social media into one indicator or focused on one specific 
social media platform (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Sina Weibo). Increasingly, however, scholars are taking 
into account the expanding range of the media types and outlets that have emerged in the digital age, and 
shifted their attention to the ways in which individual media users mix and match various forms of usage 
(Taneja, Webster, Malthouse, & Ksiazek, 2012; Webster, 2014). This focus on “media repertoires” captures 
the ritualistic or habitual ways in which individuals combine various sorts of media use into a single bundle 
of practices (Hasebrink & Popp, 2006; van Rees & van Eijck, 2003; Yuan, 2011). Note that there is no 
consensus as to which media type (print vs. audiovisual, off-line vs. online, elite newspapers vs. popular 
newspapers, etc.) or outlet (TV channels, newspaper titles, social media platforms, etc.) should be 
incorporated. As a result, operational definitions of media repertoires can be quite varied. Recent studies 
of news repertoires testify to that. Bos, Kruikemeier, and Vreese (2016), with relatively few online items, 
find “minimalists,” “public news consumers,” “popular news consumers,” and “omnivores” for the 
Netherlands. Edgerly, Vraga, Bode, Thorson, and Thorson (2018), distinguishing also by device, find “news 
avoiders,” “curated news only,” “traditional news only,” and “news omnivores.” And Strömbäck et al. 
(2018), analyzing mainly online and off-line versions of traditional media, find “minimalists,” “public news 
consumers,” “local news consumers,” “social media news consumers,” and “popular online news 
consumers.” 
 
Explanatory models of media repertoires have emphasized both socioeconomic characteristics—such 
as gender, age, and educational level (Strömbäck et al., 2018; van Rees & van Eijck, 2003)—and more 
structural factors—such as access to media, program schedules, and audience availability (Webster, 2014; 
Yuan, 2011). More and more, these elements have been integrated into one model of “media duality” (Webster, 
2014), in which both individual and structural or contextual factors are shown to affect media choices and to 
shape media as well as news repertoires (Edgerly et al., 2018; S. Kim, 2014; Taneja et al., 2012; Yuan & 
Ksiazek, 2011). 
 
Three important limitations stand out in this literature. First, specific social media platforms are 
not often distinguished in repertoires. Boczkowski, Matassi, and Mitchelstein (2018) disclose the distinct 
meanings attributed to social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram, but do not show how 
platforms are combined in actual repertoires. Second, as far as we know, inventories of media repertoires 
of both traditional and social media in the Chinese context have not yet been conducted. Third, despite the 
growing attention on how audiences perceive the credibility of different media types (Appelman & Sundar, 
2016), this has not often been linked to media repertoires. 
 
As argued previously, we do not want to stop at mapping and explaining media repertoires among 
young Chinese adults; we also intend to investigate how these repertoires are related to political 
involvement. We found two previous studies examining this type of impact of repertoires. One study 
suggests that social media news consumers are more likely to participate in online politics than in other 
news repertoires (Strömbäck et al., 2018). The other study found that, among U.S. teenagers, news 
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omnivores display higher levels of online political participation than those who receive only curated news 
(Edgerly et al., 2018). What impacts media repertoires have in the Chinese context has yet to be seen. 
 




The data collection process consisted of two phases. First, on May 21, 2016, a pilot survey was 
conducted with 120 selected respondents familiar with the Chinese media system. The survey applied 
snowball sampling. Accordingly, the questionnaire was adjusted on the basis of these respondents’ 
feedback. The final survey contained 39 questions (131 subitems) about media usage and trust in media. 
Note that the survey had three focus areas: arts and culture, health and fitness, and politics. In this article, 
we employ the data on politics. Next, the revised questionnaire was distributed by the research agency 
wjx.cn, whose database covers all Chinese provinces. Given our focus on young adults, only panel members 
within the age range of 18–40 years were approached. Participants received compensation from the survey 
company. The final data were collected in July 2016. Although 1,850 agreed to participate, 280 did not 
provide answers on our dependent variables, and 537 spent little time on the survey (less than 10 minutes, 
implying more than four questions per minute) in combination with suspicious answering patterns (wrong 
answers to trap questions inserted by survey company, or exactly the same answers for dozens of items 
in a row). In line with the recommendations of the survey company, these respondents were removed from 
the final sample (N = 1,033; response rate of 12.9%). Though this response rate is relatively low, it is 
similar to that of previous Web survey-based studies carried out in China (Shih & Fan, 2008; Yamamoto, 
Kushin, & Dalisay, 2015). In the final sample, there were slightly more female (51.5%) than male 
respondents (48.5%). The mean age is 29.7 years (SD = 5.02 years). The sample contained a relatively 
large share of highly educated participants (50.1% college graduates). Up until December 2017, people 
with high school or vocational school degrees and with junior college or higher education constituted, 
respectively, 25.4% and 20.4% of Chinese Internet users (China Internet Network Information Center 
[CNNIC], 2019). In line with this overrepresentation of higher educated people, most participants lived in 
cities (97.8%). Additionally, the overrepresentation of higher education was tied in with a 
disproportionately high representation of CCP membership (Hyun & Kim, 2015; Hyun, Kim, & Sun, 2014). 
Around 33% of the respondents were CCP members, which was well ahead of the national figure of 6% 
(Hyun & Kim, 2015; Kennedy, Nagao, & Liu, 2018). However, Skoric, Zhu, and Pang (2016) note that 






Guided by previous studies (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011), traditional media usage was 
measured by four items: television (both TV set and online), newspaper (only in print), magazine (only in 
print), and radio (both on radio set and online). Respondents were asked to indicate how often they used 
each medium, and they answered using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = never to 5 = almost daily). 
Similarly, social media usage was measured by asking participants to indicate, on a 5-point scale, how 
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often they used a selection of eight Chinese social media platforms: Sina Weibo, WeChat, Qzone, 




The question about political trust was formulated thus: “How much do you trust the government?” 
Response categories ran from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). This operationalization followed other studies 
(e.g., Hooghe, 2011; Shen & Guo, 2013). 
 
Online Political Engagement 
 
Measurement for online political engagement was inspired by various previous studies (Skoric, 
2011; Yamamoto et al., 2015). Respondents were asked how often they engage in five different types of 
political activities on social media: “reading news related to politics or public affairs”; “reading blogs or 
microblogging comments related to politics or public affairs”; “sharing with others on topics of politics or 
public affairs”; “posting comments in online discussion groups related to politics or public affairs”; and 
“following social media accounts of the government and of public administration institutions” (1 = not at 




Guided by previous studies (Holt et al., 2013; D. Kim, 2012), the political interest item included 
six questions (e.g., “How frequently do you follow what is going on in politics and public affairs?” and “How 
interested would you say you are in politics?”). Answers to these questions were then ranged on a political 
interest scale (M = 3.96, SD = .66, a = .87) that ran from 1 (not interested at all) to 5 (very interested). 
 
Credibility of Political Information Gathered From the Media 
 
Guided by previous measurements, five dimensions of media credibility were combined to form 
a single scale measure (Appelman & Sundar, 2016; Johnson & Kaye, 1998, 2009). Participants were 
asked to rate the degree of believability, accuracy, fairness, depth, and trustworthiness of political 
information found in traditional and social media on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). 
The scores were combined into two credibility indexes, one for political information obtained from 
traditional media (M = 5.38, SD = 1.14, a = .95) and the other for political information obtained from 
social media (M = 5.01, SD = 1.12, a = .94). 
 
 
1 We do not claim that the social media platforms selected here are the most popular or the most 
representative ones. Some are among the most widely used platforms (Weibo, WeChat), whereas others 
were selected because they are representative in specific domains (e.g., Douban.com in arts and culture, 
Guokr.com in science). Also, our selection pays heed to what the cited academic literature signals as being 
popular among young Chinese, as well as to information concerning the various research reports by the 
CNNIC (2017). 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Cross-Media Usage  3805 
Interpersonal Trust 
 
This study also examines individuals’ interpersonal trust, owing to its close relationship with 
political trust (see Mishler & Rose, 2001). Interpersonal trust was measured via answers to three 
questions; these answers were then averaged on a 7-point scale, so as to build a composite index (M = 




Age is measured from the year of birth, which ranges from 1976 to 1998. Gender is coded so that 
female = 1. Participants’ educational level was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (less than primary 
school) to 5 (beyond master’s degree). Apart from these demographic factors, we controlled for CCP 
membership because this factor can affect how individuals use media (Hyun & Kim, 2015). CCP 
membership is a dummy variable. 
 
Contextual Factors: Size, Place of Residence, and Internet Penetration Rate 
 
We used respondents’ IP addresses to find their location. The place of residence would fall into 
one out of six possible categories, according to population size. These categories were village/town 
(2.23%), small city (below half a million; 8.33%), medium city (half a million to 1 million; 13.65%), big 
city (1 to 5 million; 14.42%), capital city (5 million to 10 million; 28.27%), and super big city (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen; 33.11%). The Internet penetration rate is measured by region, on the 




To estimate the media repertoires of young Chinese, we apply LCA using the Latent GOLD 
software (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016). This technique enables us to find discrete groups, or classes, 
on the basis of respondents’ response patterns, as well as distribute individual respondents into these 
groups on the basis of conditional probabilities. In the first step, we employed the cluster option in 
Latent GOLD, with the media usage questions as indicators of class membership. The model was 
estimated using 200 random sets of starting values, and a minimum of 30 iterations per set. For 
answering RQ2 and RQ3, we rely on two relatively recently developed functionalities within LCA: Step-
3 models with covariates and Step-3 models with distal outcomes (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016). The 
first functionality enables researchers to examine which covariates best predict membership of classes. 
In line with recommendations from the literature, we apply ML (i.e., maximum likelihood) bias 
correction (Vermunt, 2010). The second functionality models memberships of classes as independent 
variables, which can predict selected distal outcomes or dependent variables (here, political outcomes) 
while controlling for other variables. Compared with saving classes and applying multinomial regression 
models or analyses of variance (ANOVAs), these Step-3 models avoid the problem that parameter 
estimates of this last step are underestimated (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016). Here, we apply the Bolck-
Croon-Hagenaars (BCH) approach (Bakk & Vermunt, 2016). 
 





Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of media usage variables. Among 12 types of media 
platforms, the frequency of WeChat usage is the highest and Guokr.com scores the lowest. The respondents 
are less likely to use traditional media such as radio, magazines, and newspapers. Four of the social media 
platforms—WeChat, Qzone, Sina Weibo, and Baidu Tieba—are used significantly more than traditional 
media—except for television, which scores highest among traditional media outlets. Zhihu.com, Tianya 
Club, Douban.com, and Guokr.com score slightly lower than print media and radio usage. Clearly social 
media such as WeChat, Qzone, Sina Weibo, and Baidu Tieba play a significant role in the daily life of the 
young adults in our sample. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Media Usage. 
 M SD 
Total traditional media usage 1   
Television1 3.79 0.924 
Radio1 2.9 1.042 
Magazine1 2.93 0.971 
Newspaper1 2.93 1.046 
Total social media usage2   
WeChat2 4.68 0.603 
Qzone2 3.69 1.100 
Sina Weibo2 3.47 1.151 
Baidu Tieba2 3.07 1.107 
Zhihu.com2 2.52 1.251 
Tianya Club2 2.52 1.142 
Douban.com2 2.43 1.099 
Guokr.com2 1.98 0.983 




To answer our first research question, we used the cluster option in Latent GOLD for estimating 
and comparing various models. Table 2 presents the summary of the model classifications. There is no 
common agreement on what are the best criteria for deciding on the optimal number of classes, but most 
scholars use the information criteria of the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and AIC (Akaike information 
criterion) in combination with finding parsimonious and interpretable solutions (Collins & Lanza, 2010; 
Porcu & Giambona, 2017). Smaller values of BIC and AIC represent more optimal balance of model fit and 
parsimony. Inspection of our criteria showed that seven and eight clusters yielded the most optimal models. 
However, the seven- and eight-cluster models are less parsimonious and more difficult to interpret. We 
therefore selected the model that contains six classes. Moreover, entropy, which indicates whether clusters 
are clearly separated, has a value of 0.968, exceeding the required value of 0.90. 
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Table 2. Summary of Test Results for the Estimated Latent Class Models. 
 LL BIC(LL) AIC(LL) Npar Entropy 
1 cluster −17,784.2339 35,734.9632 35616.4677 24 1.000 
2 cluster −15,131.9356 30,603.7996 30361.8713 49 0.9912 
3 cluster −13,659.4883 27,832.3378 27466.9766 74 0.9628 
4 cluster −12,350.0123 25,386.8186 24,898.0245 99 0.9698 
5 cluster −11,702.8463 24,265.9196 23,653.6927 124 0.9625 
6 cluster −10,983.8042 23,001.2682 22,265.6084 149 0.9682 
7 cluster −10,675.0201 22,557.1329 21,698.0402 174 0.9688 
8 cluster −9,909.9762 21,200.4778 20,217.9523 199 0.9877 
Note: LL=log-likelihood; BIC(LL)=Bayesian information criterion (of LL); AIC=Akaike information criterion; 
Npar=number of parameters. 
 
Table 3 presents the means of the items that indicate the differences in response patterns that 
distinguish the clusters (profile output). On the basis of these coefficients, we can find meaningful labels for 
the clusters. The first cluster, which represents about 22% of the research sample, is labeled voracious 
omnivores. Individuals in this cluster are likely to use every media platform on a weekly or daily basis. The 
second largest cluster (20%) consists of the moderate omnivores. Young adults in this group are very likely to 
use almost all the media platforms included in this study, but, with the exception of television, Sina Weibo, 
WeChat, and Baidu Tieba, they use these media only a couple times per month. Cluster 3 is slightly smaller 
(18%) and combines a moderate use of traditional media with a preference for communication- and sharing-
oriented social media platforms (Sina Weibo, WeChat, Qzone). We thus label this cluster communication 
oriented. 
 
The fourth cluster consists of the digitally focused, who comprise 16% of the research sample. 
This group is least likely to use traditional media, but does use quite a lot of social media platforms 
(although not as much as the voracious omnivores). The fifth cluster represents about 15% of the 
respondents, whom we label minimal users. Individuals in this group use few different media, but spend 
most of their time on only two popular social media platforms—WeChat and Qzone—and television. The 
last and smallest cluster (9%) is also quite omnivorous, but less so than Cluster 1, and compared with 
Cluster 2 they are more interested in traditional media. Individuals in this cluster present a very high 
probability of using newspapers and magazines (and actually, they also rank quite high when it comes to 
listening to the radio). Therefore, we label them print interested. In sum, while Chinese cross-media 
repertoires show clear similarities to repertoires found elsewhere (e.g., minimal users, omnivores), the 
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Table 3. Cross-Media Repertoires Among Young Chinese Adults. 













Cluster size 21.7% 19.9% 18.6% 16.0% 14.8% 9.0% 
Indicators       
Television 4.04 (.061) 3.89 (.062) 3.68 (.076) 3.44 (.064) 3.53 (.080) 4.30 (.054) 
Newspapers 3.24 (.078) 2.94 (.075) 2.65 (.070) 2.46 (.054) 2.36 (.063) 4.55 (.076) 
Magazines 3.27 (.072) 2.90 (.065) 2.58 (.057) 2.61 (.055) 2.26 (.056) 4.55 (.076) 
Radio 3.20 (.076) 2.88 (.070) 2.71 (.076) 2.54 (.060) 2.34 (.073) 4.11 (.096) 
Sina Weibo 4.05 (.053) 3.55 (.067) 3.34 (.086) 3.18 (.077) 2.45 (.108) 4.39 (.065) 
WeChat 5.00 (.001) 5.00 (.001) 5.00 (.001) 3.79 (.048) 4.61 (.051) 4.25 (.092) 
Qzone 4.06 (.072) 3.76 (.075) 3.52 (.087) 3.36 (.077) 3.28 (.095) 4.31 (.074) 
Zhihu 3.33 (.065) 2.58 (.074) 1.98 (.076) 2.35 (.074) 1.00 (.003) 4.30 (.088) 
Baidu Tieba 3.62 (.060) 3.10 (.063) 2.87 (.073) 3.04 (.068) 1.87 (.083) 4.13 (.103) 
Tianya Club 3.36 (.062) 2.54 (.057) 2.27 (.071) 2.38 (.067) 1.00 (.003) 3.69 (.121) 
Douban.com 3.50 (.054) 2.53 (.054) 2.05 (.064) 2.34 (.069) 1.00 (.003) 2.96 (.129) 
Guokr.com 3.23 (.045) 2.00 (.002) 1.00 (.002) 1.93 (.071) 1.00 (.003) 2.61 (.104) 
Note. Results profile output: mean scores. Means are on a scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very frequently); 




What Predicts Cross-Media Repertoires? 
 
Table 4 presents the outcomes of the Step-3 approach with covariates. More particularly, we 
report the parameters which can be interpreted as regression coefficients, but note that we used effect 
coding for the cluster variables. Effect coding implies that the coefficient can be interpreted as the 
difference between the mean of the coded group and the unweighted grand mean (rather than that every 
coefficient represents the difference between that specific category and one chosen reference category, as 
with dummy coding). Inspection of the Wald values shows that classes differ significantly in terms of the 
predictive value of age, gender, education, the size of the current place of residence, interpersonal trust, 
and the perceived credibility of political information received from both social and traditional media. 
Communist Party membership is not significant. 
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Table 4. User Characteristics of Cluster Members of Cross-Media Repertoires. 










Minimal users Print interested Wald 
Cluster size 21.7% 19.9% 18.6% 16.0% 14.8% 9.0%  
Covariates        
Age −.014 (.015) .020 (.014) .016 (.014) −.076 (.016) .016 (.017) .038 (.028) 26.3*** 
Female .385 (.144) −.092 (.140) .420 (.145) −.179 (.159) .006 (.164) −.542 (.267) 17.7** 
Educational level .145 (.104) −.161 (.100) .025 (.108) −.282 (.119) −.798 (.116) 1.070 (.296) 57.6*** 
Membership CCP .406 (.149) −.044 (.153) −.158 (.154) .039 (.181) −.248 (.196) .005 (.258) 9.3 
Place of residence size .208 (.058) −.061 (.050) −.122 (.054) .068 (.054) −.160 (.057) .203 (.094) 25.1*** 
Interpersonal trust .119 (.076) .101 (.086) .082 (.083) −.266 (.077) −.117 (.082) .081 (.147) 17.2** 
Credibility political info 
social media 
.217 (.098) −.009 (.088) −.021 (.092) −.269 (.083) −.163 (.097) .245 (.165) 17.2** 
Credibility pol info 
traditional media 
−.087 (.099) −.218 (.089) −.207 (.096) −.303 (.082) −.234 (.096) 1.049 (.212) 27.7*** 
Intercept −1.585 (.698) 1.253 (.683) .844 (.677) 7.030 (.679) 4.615 (.746) −12.157 (1.693) 135.6*** 
Note. Parameters in effect coding; between brackets standard errors. The models are estimated using the Step-3 procedure in Latent GOLD with 
co-variates (proportional classification; ML bias correction). n = 1,030. Covariates are treated as numeric variables, except for gender and 
member CP (nominal). p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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How do the clusters differ in background characteristics? Of all clusters, the voracious omnivores 
and the print interested have the highest educational level, come more often from bigger cities, have 
relatively high levels of interpersonal trust, and consider political information on social media relatively 
credible. Whereas the print interested also find traditional media credible, the voracious omnivores, 
however, do not show a significant outcome for this variable. Also, the gender composition of the groups 
differs: print-interested individuals are much more likely to be male than female. The digitally focused and 
the minimal users also share a number of characteristics. These clusters have a relatively low education, 
display low levels of interpersonal trust, and a low ranking of the credibility of political information contained 
in the media (particularly traditional). What distinguishes them most is that the digitally focused are 
younger, while the minimal users have slightly lower educational levels. The other two clusters—the 
moderate omnivores and the communication-oriented—take in-between positions on most variables. For 
example, their educational levels are lower than that of Clusters 1 and 6, but higher than Clusters 4 and 5. 
Their interpersonal trust is similar to that of Clusters 1 and 6, but many of them do not perceive the political 
information on (particularly) traditional media as credible. The main difference between the moderate 
omnivores and the communication oriented is that members of the latter class are more likely to be female. 
 
In sum, more highly educated and relatively older individuals tend to be (voracious) omnivorous 
and more interested in traditional media. These repertoires are aligned with perceptions of higher credibility 
of mediatized political information and with greater interpersonal trust. Still, among the younger 
respondents we also find broadly oriented media users—moderate omnivores—who perhaps will increase 
their levels of media consumption in the future. 
 
Political Implications of Cross-Media Repertoires 
 
Our final research question addresses the issue of whether media repertoires are associated with 
forms of political involvement such as political trust, political interest, and online political engagement. Table 
5 presents the outcomes from three Step-3 analyses with distal outcomes. The coefficients can be 
interpreted as regression coefficients, but note that, again, we used effect coding for the cluster variables. 
The Wald statistics for cluster variables implies that the clusters differ significantly for all three political 
outcomes; that is, at least one class is different from the mean of the other classes. Thus, controlled for the 
confounding variables reported in the table, clusters appear to be associated with different levels of political 
trust, online political engagement, and political interest. In other words, regardless of how credible someone 
finds, for example, the information acquired from social media or traditional media, individual orientation 
toward politics still appears to be related to their media repertoire. 
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Table 5. Distal Outcomes for Three Aspects of Political Involvement. 
 Political trust (continuous) Online political engagement 
(continuous) 
Political interest  
(continuous) 





Clusters       
Voracious omnivores −.003 (.070) 135.9***  .255 (.039) 181.2*** .157 (.033) 43.8*** 
Moderate omnivores −.214 (.079)   .039 (.040)  .019 (.036)  
Communication oriented −.191 (.082)  −.117 (.046)  −.020 (.041)  
Digitally focused −.198 (.083)  −.223 (.044)  −.136 (.043)  
Minimal users −.473 (.097)  −.480 (.054)  −.182 (.049)  
Print interested  1.079 (.093)   .526 (.050)   .161 (.035)  
Individual factors       
Age  −.007 (.008) 0.8  .011 (.004) 7.2** .009 (.003) 6.7** 
Female .115 (.037) 9.8** −.084 (.020) 18.5*** −.064 (.018) 13.5*** 
Educational level .009 (.049) 0.3  .136 (.027) 25.4*** .097 (.024) 16.7*** 
Membership CCP .070 (.038) 2.2  .041 (.022) 3.6 −.012 (.019) 0.4 
Place of residence size .015 (.030) 0.2  .015 (.015) 1.0 −.012 (.014) 0.8 
Interpersonal trust .226 (.046) 24.1***  .075 (.024) 9.5** .091 (.023) 16.1*** 
Credibility of political information 
from social media 
.245 (.054) 20.8***  .141 (.028) 25.8*** .055 (.027) 4.1* 
Credibility of political information 
from traditional media 
.438 (.054) 64.9*** .053 (.029) 3.5 .137 (.028) 24.3*** 
Intercept .165 (.353) 0.2 .593 (.181) 10.7** 1.255 (.168) 55.939* ** 
Variances DV 1.124 (.069) 321.9*** .366 (.019) 391.3*** .303 (.021) 211.9*** 
N 1,030  1,030  1,030  
Log-likelihood (LL) −3383.03  −2755.09  −2657.82  
BIC (LL) 6,870.13  5,614.24  5,419.70  
Pseudo R2 16.5%  23.2%  17.4%  
Note. Results of Step-3 analysis with distal outcomes, applying BCH adjustment. Independent variables are treated as numeric, except for the following: 
female; membership (nominal); education; place of residence (ordinal). The parameters are effect coding. *p < .05. **p < .01 ***p < .001. Pseudo R2 is 
based on error type minus log-likelihood, which is comparable to McFadden R2. 
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The most extreme outcomes are found for political trust. Print-interested individuals have the 
highest levels of political trust, voracious omnivores have average levels, whereas minimal users display the 
lowest level of trust. In addition to these effects, there are still positive effects of both the perceived 
credibility of political information and interpersonal trust. Women are more likely to show political trust than 
are men, but other demographics are evenly distributed across trust levels. 
 
For online political engagement, we find similar patterns for the cluster variables, but here the 
moderate omnivores have slightly higher levels of engagement than do the communication oriented and the 
digitally focused. We find different patterns for the individual factors. How credible the various individuals 
find the political information in traditional media does not matter, whereas a negative effect might have 
been expected. Males and the higher educated are more likely to get involved in online participation in 
political matters. 
 
By comparison, political interest has the weakest connection to cross-media repertoires. Voracious 
omnivores and print interested are most likely to show political interest, but the differences with the other 
four clusters are smaller than on the dimensions of trust and online engagement. Minimal users continue to 
be the least politically oriented, but inspection of the paired comparisons (not reported) shows that the 
difference with Cluster 4 is actually not significant. Political interest is associated with both the perceived 
credibility of political information found on social media sites (barely significant) and in traditional media 
(very significant). Higher levels of education, being male, and higher levels of interpersonal trust are 
associated with higher political interest. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This study attempts to advance our understanding of how, in the repressive media ecology of China, 
traditional and social media get combined by young adults into distinct cross-media repertoires, and how these 
repertoires relate to youngsters’ political orientations. We find six different repertoires, which run progressively 
from quite limited (minimal users) to repertoires with a specific media orientation (digitally focused users, 
communication-oriented users), then to relatively diverse repertoires (moderate omnivores), and finally to 
repertoires that mix many traditional media types and social media platforms (voracious omnivores, print-
interested users). In general, the younger and poorly educated respondents tended to be less inclined to 
include traditional media in their repertoire. Yet they also showed lower levels of interpersonal trust and did 
not find political information in the media very credible. This raises at least two questions. Using traditional 
media (television, newspapers, magazines, radio) is associated with age and education. Should we interpret 
these findings as a life-course effect, or does it indicate cohort differences? In other words, what will happen 
when the current teenagers and twentysomethings grow up and finish their education? Second, why do we 
find so few differences between the perceived credibility of the political information available in social media 
and in traditional media respectively? That voracious omnivores and the print interested also perceive as 
credible the information they get from social media can be explained by their omnivorous orientation (they use 
all kinds of media); but repertoires that focus on social media also judge traditional and social media to be 
alike in point of credibility (so the digitally focused and the communication oriented). This suggests (1) that, 
in the Chinese media environment, young adults see little difference between the quality of media types, and 
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(2) that the way in which they judge this quality has more to do social background with than with how they 
experience media usage. But this needs further investigation. 
 
We also examined how cross-media repertoires relate to political involvement. Although we studied 
three quite distinct types of involvement, the findings show clear similarities. The print-interested show the 
greatest political trust, the highest online political engagement, and the most political interest, followed by the 
voracious omnivores. Then come the moderate omnivores, at some distance, which implies that more 
omnivorous media repertoires are positively related to all types of political involvement, whereas heavier 
reliance on social media platforms has negative associations. That preference for print is most strongly linked 
with political trust suggests that print media are most strongly associated with the Chinese government. 
 
Some limitations of this study should be mentioned. As in other studies of media usage and political 
participation in China (e.g., Shen & Guo, 2013; Zhang & Lin, 2014), we cannot make strong causal claims 
for our effects, because we rely on cross-sectional data. This implies that political involvement can also drive 
media usage. What is more, our sample is not representative of all Chinese young adults; it contains a large 
proportion of urban youths with a higher education. Future research could examine the motivations of young 
adults in using specific media platforms, as well as the degree of political content they come across (Choi, 
2016). In the Chinese context, the role of censorship and the influence of the CCP on how young adults use 
(social) media remain two important elements to address (Hyun & Kim, 2015). 
 
Overall, there is evidence that in China, too, more diverse media repertoires go hand in hand with 
stronger forms of political engagement (see Edgerly et al., 2018). Although social media platforms are an 
essential part of such a diversified repertoire, traditional media remain important: Repertoires that contain 
traditional media show higher political engagement. A disadvantage of the media repertoire approach is that 
outcomes very much hinge on the items used. Because our measurement of traditional media is, for 
example, less extensive than that of Strömbäck et al. (2018), we find different types of repertoires. Yet the 
increasing importance of social media platforms and their multiplicity make it pertinent to incorporate these 
platforms into future repertoire research (Boczkowski et al., 2018). The findings of the present research 




Anne-Marie, B., & Wang, J. (2009). China’s strengthened new order and the role of propaganda. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 18(62), 767‒788. doi:10.1080/10670560903172832 
 
Appelman, A., & Sundar, S. S. (2016). Measuring message credibility: Construction and validation of an 
exclusive scale. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(1), 59–79. 
doi:10.1177/1077699015606057 
 
Bakk, Z., & Vermunt, J. K. (2016). Robustness of stepwise latent class modeling with continuous distal 
outcomes. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 23(1), 20–31. 
doi:10.1080/10705511.2014.955104 
 
3814  Q. Gong, M. Verboord, and S. Janssen International Journal of Communication 14(2020) 
Bakker, T. P., & de Vreese, C. H. (2011). Good news for the future? Young people, Internet use, and 
political participation. Communication Research, 38(4), 451–470. 
doi:10.1177/0093650210381738 
 
Boczkowski, P. J., Matassi, M., & Mitchelstein, E. (2018). How young users deal with multiple platforms: 
The role of meaning-making in social media repertoires. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 23(5), 245–259. doi:10.1093/jcmc/zmy012 
 
Bos, L., Kruikemeier, S., & de Vreese, C. (2016). Nation binding: How public service broadcasting 
mitigates political selective exposure. PLOS ONE, 11(5), e0155112. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155112 
 
Boulianne, S. (2015). Social media use and participation: A meta-analysis of current research. 
Information, Communication & Society, 18(5), 524–538. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2015.1008542 
 
Ceron, A. (2015). Internet, news, and political trust: The difference between social media and online 
media outlets. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 20(5), 487–503. 
doi:10.1111/jcc4.12129 
 
Chan, M., Wu, X., Hao, Y., Xi, R., & Jin, T. (2012). Microblogging, online expression, and political efficacy 
among young Chinese citizens: The moderating role of information and entertainment needs in 
the use of Weibo. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 15(7), 345–349. 
doi:10.1089/cyber.2012.0109 
 
Chen, J., & Sun, L. (2019). Media influence on citizens’ government trust: A cross-sectional data analysis 
of China. International Journal of Public Administration, 42(13), 1122–1134. 
doi:10.1080/01900692.2019.1575854 
 
China Internet Network Information Center. (2017). The research report on the social network usage in 
China. Beijing: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
China Internet Network Information Center. (2019). The 43rd statistics report on Internet development in 
China. Retrieved from http://www.cac.gov.cn/wxb_pdf/0228043.pdf  
 
Choi, J. (2016). Why do people use news differently on SNSs? An investigation of the role of motivations, 
media repertoires, and technology cluster on citizens’ news-related activities. Computers in 
Human Behavior, 54, 249–256. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.08.006 
 
Collins, L. M., & Lanza, S. T. (2010). Latent class and latent transition analysis. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Cross-Media Usage  3815 
Edgerly, S. (2017). Seeking out and avoiding the news media: Young adults’ proposed strategies for 
obtaining current events information. Mass Communication and Society, 20(3), 358–377. 
doi:10.1080/15205436.2016.1262424 
 
Edgerly, S., Vraga, E. K., Bode, L., Thorson, K., & Thorson, E. (2018). New media, new relationship to 
participation? A closer look at youth news repertoires and political participation. Journalism & 
Mass Communication Quarterly, 95(1), 192–212. doi:10.1177/1077699017706928 
 
Eltantawy, N., & Wiest, J. B. (2011). Social media in the Egyptian revolution: Reconsidering resource 
mobilization theory. International Journal of Communication, 5(2011), 1207–1224. 
 
Gil de Zúñiga, H., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals’ social 
capital, civic engagement and political participation. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 17(3), 319–336. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x 
 
Gil de Zúñiga, H., Molyneux, L., & Zheng, P. (2014). Social media, political expression, and political 
participation: Panel analysis of lagged and concurrent relationships. Journal of Communication, 
64(4), 612–634. doi:10.1111/jcom.12103 
 
Gleiss, M. S. (2015). Speaking up for the suffering (br)other: Weibo activism, discursive struggles, and 
minimal politics in China. Media, Culture & Society, 37(4), 513–529. 
doi:10.1177/0163443714566897 
 
Hasebrink, U., & Popp, J. (2006). Media repertoires as a result of selective media use: A conceptual 
approach to the analysis of patterns of exposure. Communications, 31(3), 369–387. 
doi:10.1515/commun.2006.023 
 
Holt, K., Shehata, A., Strömbäck, J., & Ljungberg, E. (2013). Age and the effects of news media attention 
and social media use on political interest and participation: Do social media function as leveller? 
European Journal of Communication, 28(1), 19–34. doi:10.1177/0267323112465369 
 
Hooghe, M. (2011). Why there is basically only one form of political trust. The British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 13(2), 269–275. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00447.x 
 
Hyun, K. D., & Kim, J. (2015). The role of new media in sustaining the status quo: Online political 
expression, nationalism, and system support in China. Information, Communication & Society, 
18(7), 766–781. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2014.994543 
 
Hyun, K. D., Kim, J., & Sun, S. (2014). News use, nationalism, and Internet use motivations as predictors 
of anti-Japanese political actions in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 24(6), 589–604. 
doi:10.1080/01292986.2014.944922 
 
3816  Q. Gong, M. Verboord, and S. Janssen International Journal of Communication 14(2020) 
Johnson, T. J., & Kaye, B. K. (1998). Cruising is believing? Comparing Internet and traditional sources on 
media credibility measures. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 75(2), 325–340. 
doi:10.1177/107769909807500208 
 
Johnson, T. J., & Kaye, B. K. (2009). In blog we trust? Deciphering credibility of components of the 
Internet among politically interested Internet users. Computers in Human Behavior, 25(1), 175–
182. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2008.08.004 
 
Jung, N., Kim, Y., & Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2011). The mediating role of knowledge and efficacy in the effects 
of communication on political participation. Mass Communication and Society, 14(4), 407–430. 
doi:10.1080/15205436.2010.496135 
 
Kennedy, J., Nagao, H., & Liu, H. (2018). Voting and values: Grassroots elections in rural and urban 
China. Politics and Governance, 6(2), 90–102. doi:10.17645/pag.v6i2.1331 
 
Kim, D. (2012). Interacting is believing? Examining bottom-up credibility of blogs among politically 
interested Internet users. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 17(4), 422–435. 
doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01583.x 
 
Kim, S. (2014). A repertoire approach to cross-platform media use behavior. New Media & Society, 18(3), 
353–372. doi:10.1177/1461444814543162 
 
Li, A. K. (2019). Papi Jiang and microcelebrity in China: A multilevel analysis. International Journal of 
Communication, 13, 3016–3034. 
 
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural 
theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30–62. 
doi:10.1177/0010414001034001002 
 
Mou, Y., Atkin, D., Fu, H., Lin, C. A., & Lau, T. Y. (2013). The influence of online forum and SNS use on 
online political discussion in China: Assessing “Spirals of Trust.” Telematics and Informatics, 
30(4), 359–369. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2013.04.002 
 
Norris, P. (2000). A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Norris, P. (2011). Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Porcu, M., & Giambona, F. (2017). Introduction to latent class analysis with applications. Journal of Early 
Adolescence, 37, 129–158. doi:10.1177/0272431616648452 
 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Cross-Media Usage  3817 
Shen, F., & Guo, Z. S. (2013). The last refuge of media persuasion: News use, national pride and political 
trust in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 23(2), 135–151. 
doi:10.1080/01292986.2012.725173 
 
Shih, T.-H., & Fan, X. (2008). Comparing response rates from Web and mail surveys: A meta-analysis. 
Field Methods, 20(3), 249–271. doi:10.1177/1525822X08317085 
 
Skoric, M. M. (2011). Introduction to the special issue: Online social capital and participation in Asia-
Pacific. Asian Journal of Communication, 21(5), 427–429. doi:10.1080/01292986.2011.602270 
 
Skoric, M. M., & Poor, N. (2013). Youth engagement in Singapore: The interplay of social and traditional 
media. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57(2), 187–204. 
doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.787076 
 
Skoric, M. M., Zhu, Q., Goh, D., & Pang, N. (2016). Social media and citizen engagement: A meta-analytic 
review. New Media & Society, 18(9), 1817–1839. doi:10.1177/1461444815616221 
 
Skoric, M. M., Zhu, Q., & Pang, N. (2016). Social media, political expression, and participation in 
Confucian Asia. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(4), 331–347. 
doi:10.1080/17544750.2016.1143378 
 
Strömbäck, J., Djerf-Pierre, M., & Shehata, A. (2016). A question of time? A longitudinal analysis of the 
relationship between news media consumption and political trust. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 21(1), 88–110. doi:10.1177/1940161215613059 
 
Strömbäck, J., Falasca, K., & Kruikemeier, S. (2018). The mix of media use matters: Investigating the 
effects of individual news repertoires on offline and online political participation. Political 
Communication, 35(3), 413–432. doi:10.1080/10584609.2017.1385549 
 
Taneja, H., Webster, J. G., Malthouse, E. C., & Ksiazek, T. B. (2012). Media consumption across 
platforms: Identifying user-defined repertoires. New Media & Society, 14(6), 951–968. 
doi:10.1177/1461444811436146 
 
van Rees, K., & van Eijck, K. (2003). Media repertoires of selective audiences: The impact of status, 
gender, and age on media use. Poetics, 31(5–6), 465–490. doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2003.09.005 
 
Vermunt, J. K. (2010). Latent class modeling with covariates: Two improved three-step approaches. 
Political Analysis, 18(4), 450–469. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq025 
 
Vermunt, J. K., & Magidson, J. (2016). Upgrade manual for Latent Gold 5.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.statisticalinnovations.com/wp-content/uploads/UpgradeManual5.1.pdf  
 
3818  Q. Gong, M. Verboord, and S. Janssen International Journal of Communication 14(2020) 
Vissers, S., & Stolle, D. (2014). The Internet and new modes of political participation: Online versus 
offline participation. Information, Communication & Society, 17(8), 937–955. 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2013.867356 
 
Webster, J. G. (2014). The marketplace of attention. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Xenos, M., Vromen, A., & Loader, B. D. (2014). The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and 
youth political engagement in three advanced democracies. Information, Communication & 
Society, 17(2), 151–167. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2013.871318 
 
Yamamoto, M., Kushin, M. J., & Dalisay, F. (2015). Social media and mobiles as political mobilization 
forces for young adults: Examining the moderating role of online political expression in political 
participation. New Media & Society, 17(6), 880–898. doi:10.1177/1461444813518390 
 
Yuan, E. (2011). News consumption across multiple media platforms: A repertoire approach. Information, 
Communication & Society, 14(7), 998–1016. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2010.549235 
 
Yuan, E., & Ksiazek, T. B. (2011). The duality of structure in China’s national television market: A network 
analysis of audience behavior. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 55(2), 180–197. 
doi:10.1080/08838151.2011.570825 
 
Zhang, X., & Lin, W.-Y. (2014). Political participation in an unlikely place: How individuals engage in politics 
through social networking sites in China. International Journal of Communication, 8, 21–42. 
